Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Induction', 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars' and 'Identity and Necessity'

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23 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
8525 Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
9175 We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
9171 The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
8518 Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
8521 Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
8515 Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
8519 Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
4033 Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
9174 It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
9172 A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
9173 We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
9176 Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
8800 If you would deny a truth if you know the full evidence, then knowledge has social aspects [Harman, by Sosa]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
9177 Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
9178 Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8512 Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8516 Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
8517 Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]