Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Intrinsic Quality of Experience', 'Knowledge and the Philosophy of Number' and 'Ordinatio'

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17 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
23623 Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
23624 The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / f. Limitation of Size
23625 Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
23628 The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
23627 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
23626 Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
23621 Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
23622 We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
15386 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
15387 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16632 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13094 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16770 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16768 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
8130 Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge]