Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Rationality', 'Mathematical Explanation' and 'The Philosophy of Philosophy'

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22 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
9593 Progress in philosophy is incremental, not an immature seeking after drama [Williamson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
6950 You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
6954 A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
9594 Correspondence to the facts is a bad account of analytic truth [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
9601 The realist/anti-realist debate is notoriously obscure and fruitless [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
9599 There cannot be vague objects, so there may be no such thing as a mountain [Williamson]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
9602 Common sense and classical logic are often simultaneously abandoned in debates on vagueness [Williamson]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
13230 Particular essence is often captured by generality [Steiner,M]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
9598 Modal thinking isn't a special intuition; it is part of ordinary counterfactual thinking [Williamson]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
16536 Williamson can't base metaphysical necessity on the psychology of causal counterfactuals [Lowe on Williamson]
9596 We scorn imagination as a test of possibility, forgetting its role in counterfactuals [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
9597 There are 'armchair' truths which are not a priori, because experience was involved [Williamson]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9592 Intuition is neither powerful nor vacuous, but reveals linguistic or conceptual competence [Williamson]
20181 When analytic philosophers run out of arguments, they present intuitions as their evidence [Williamson]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
6955 Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
6952 Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
6953 All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13229 Maybe an instance of a generalisation is more explanatory than the particular case [Steiner,M]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / m. Explanation by proof
13231 Explanatory proofs rest on 'characterizing properties' of entities or structure [Steiner,M]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
6951 Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
9595 You might know that the word 'gob' meant 'mouth', but not be competent to use it [Williamson]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 5. Culture
9600 If languages are intertranslatable, and cognition is innate, then cultures are all similar [Williamson]