58 ideas
| 21761 | If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21764 | Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21769 | We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel] |
| 3099 | Inference is never a conscious process [Harman] |
| 3077 | Reasoning might be defined in terms of its functional role, which is to produce knowledge [Harman] |
| 22037 | Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 3092 | If you believe that some of your beliefs are false, then at least one of your beliefs IS false [Harman] |
| 21983 | Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel] |
| 21985 | The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel] |
| 21978 | Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 21766 | Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 3093 | Any two states are logically linked, by being entailed by their conjunction [Harman] |
| 3098 | Deductive logic is the only logic there is [Harman] |
| 3094 | You don't have to accept the conclusion of a valid argument [Harman] |
| 3084 | Our underlying predicates represent words in the language, not universal concepts [Harman] |
| 3080 | Logical form is the part of a sentence structure which involves logical elements [Harman] |
| 3081 | A theory of truth in a language must involve a theory of logical form [Harman] |
| 21762 | To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21977 | Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel] |
| 21760 | Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 21765 | The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22059 | Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 22083 | Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 22080 | The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel] |
| 3100 | You have to reaffirm all your beliefs when you make a logical inference [Harman] |
| 21772 | In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel] |
| 20954 | The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 21972 | Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 22038 | Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard] |
| 22044 | Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel] |
| 21464 | The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner] |
| 22084 | Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel] |
| 21975 | The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel] |
| 21976 | The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW] |
| 3089 | Only lack of imagination makes us think that 'cats are animals' is analytic [Harman] |
| 3088 | Analyticity is postulated because we can't imagine some things being true, but we may just lack imagination [Harman] |
| 3101 | Memories are not just preserved, they are constantly reinferred [Harman] |
| 3074 | People's reasons for belief are rarely conscious [Harman] |
| 3097 | We don't distinguish between accepting, and accepting as evidence [Harman] |
| 22058 | Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 6369 | In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons [Harman, by Pollock/Cruz] |
| 3096 | Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman] |
| 3095 | Induction is an attempt to increase the coherence of our explanations [Harman] |
| 3073 | We see ourselves in the world as a map [Harman] |
| 3076 | Defining dispositions is circular [Harman] |
| 3075 | Could a cloud have a headache if its particles formed into the right pattern? [Harman] |
| 3086 | Are there any meanings apart from in a language? [Harman] |
| 20953 | Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie] |
| 3078 | Speech acts, communication, representation and truth form a single theory [Harman] |
| 3090 | There is only similarity in meaning, never sameness in meaning [Harman] |
| 3082 | Ambiguity is when different underlying truth-conditional structures have the same surface form [Harman] |
| 3079 | Truth in a language is explained by how the structural elements of a sentence contribute to its truth conditions [Harman] |
| 3085 | Sentences are different from propositions, since two sentences can express one proposition [Harman] |
| 3087 | The analytic/synthetic distinction is a silly division of thought into encyclopaedia and dictionary [Harman] |
| 21763 | When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate] |
| 3083 | Many predicates totally resist translation, so a universal underlying structure to languages is unlikely [Harman] |
| 20696 | We can approach knowledge of God by negative attributes [Maimonides] |
| 19085 | Thinking of God as resembling humans results from a bad translation of Genesis 1:26 [Maimonides] |