25 ideas
12596 | Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman] |
12599 | Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman] |
12595 | We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman] |
12597 | I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman] |
12598 | Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman] |
19520 | Evidentialism is not axiomatic; the evidence itself inclines us towards evidentialism [Conee] |
19521 | If pure guesses were reliable, reliabilists would have to endorse them [Conee] |
19522 | More than actual reliability is needed, since I may mistakenly doubt what is reliable [Conee] |
19523 | Reliabilism is poor on reflective judgements about hypothetical cases [Conee] |
12602 | There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman] |
12603 | We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman] |
12601 | The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman] |
12592 | Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman] |
12590 | Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman] |
12593 | The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman] |
12588 | Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman] |
12589 | Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman] |
12600 | The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman] |
12594 | If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman] |
12591 | Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman] |
22392 | Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot] |
23685 | Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright] |
23691 | Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot] |
22391 | Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot] |
22389 | Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot] |