52 ideas
1642 | We must fight fiercely for knowledge, understanding and intelligence [Plato] |
1645 | The desire to split everything into its parts is unpleasant and unphilosophical [Plato] |
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
287 | Good analysis involves dividing things into appropriate forms without confusion [Plato] |
1644 | Dialectic should only be taught to those who already philosophise well [Plato] |
20478 | In discussion a person's opinions are shown to be in conflict, leading to calm self-criticism [Plato] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
11278 | What does 'that which is not' refer to? [Plato] |
1643 | If statements about non-existence are logically puzzling, so are statements about existence [Plato] |
7022 | To be is to have a capacity, to act on other things, or to receive actions [Plato] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
1641 | Some alarming thinkers think that only things which you can touch exist [Plato] |
10784 | Whenever there's speech it has to be about something [Plato] |
16122 | Good thinkers spot forms spread through things, or included within some larger form [Plato] |
10422 | The not-beautiful is part of the beautiful, though opposed to it, and is just as real [Plato] |
15855 | If we see everything as separate, we can then give no account of it [Plato] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
1637 | A soul without understanding is ugly [Plato] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |
1636 | Wickedness is an illness of the soul [Plato] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
1638 | Didactic education is hard work and achieves little [Plato] |