15 ideas
| 16985 | Possible worlds allowed the application of set-theoretic models to modal logic [Kripke] |
| 12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
| 16982 | A man has two names if the historical chains are different - even if they are the same! [Kripke] |
| 12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
| 12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
| 12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
| 12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
| 16981 | With the necessity of self-identity plus Leibniz's Law, identity has to be an 'internal' relation [Kripke] |
| 4942 | The indiscernibility of identicals is as self-evident as the law of contradiction [Kripke] |
| 16984 | I don't think possible worlds reductively reveal the natures of modal operators etc. [Kripke] |
| 9385 | The very act of designating of an object with properties gives knowledge of a contingent truth [Kripke] |
| 4943 | Instead of talking about possible worlds, we can always say "It is possible that.." [Kripke] |
| 16983 | Probability with dice uses possible worlds, abstractions which fictionally simplify things [Kripke] |
| 12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |