Combining Texts

All the ideas for '(Nonsolipsistic) Conceptual Role Semantics', 'Ruling Passions' and 'Introduction: Truth and Truth-Making'

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32 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Reasoning aims at increasing explanatory coherence [Harman]
Reason conservatively: stick to your beliefs, and prefer reasoning that preserves most of them [Harman]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We have a theory of logic (implication and inconsistency), but not of inference or reasoning [Harman]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
I might accept P and Q as likely, but reject P-and-Q as unlikely [Harman]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality is the overlap of true complete theories [Harman]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
There is no natural border between inner and outer [Harman]
We can only describe mental attitudes in relation to the external world [Harman]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
The way things look is a relational matter, not an intrinsic matter [Harman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Concepts in thought have content, but not meaning, which requires communication [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Take meaning to be use in calculation with concepts, rather than in communication [Harman]
The use theory attaches meanings to words, not to sentences [Harman]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
Meaning from use of thoughts, constructed from concepts, which have a role relating to reality [Harman]
Some regard conceptual role semantics as an entirely internal matter [Harman]
The content of thought is relations, between mental states, things in the world, and contexts [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
If one proposition negates the other, which is the negative one? [Harman]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / a. Translation
Mastery of a language requires thinking, and not just communication [Harman]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]