Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning', 'The Philosophy of Art (2nd ed)' and 'The Evolution of Logic'

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79 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / c. Eighteenth century philosophy
We are all post-Kantians, because he set the current agenda for philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
The problems are the monuments of philosophy [Hart,WD]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
To study abstract problems, some knowledge of set theory is essential [Hart,WD]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
Tarski showed how we could have a correspondence theory of truth, without using 'facts' [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Truth for sentences is satisfaction of formulae; for sentences, either all sequences satisfy it (true) or none do [Hart,WD]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
A first-order language has an infinity of T-sentences, which cannot add up to a definition of truth [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof: infer a conditional, if the consequent can be deduced from the antecedent [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 2. Tools of Predicate Calculus / e. Existential quantifier ∃
∃y... is read as 'There exists an individual, call it y, such that...', and not 'There exists a y such that...' [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory articulates the concept of order (through relations) [Hart,WD]
Nowadays ZFC and NBG are the set theories; types are dead, and NF is only useful for the whole universe [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
∈ relates across layers, while ⊆ relates within layers [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Without the empty set we could not form a∩b without checking that a and b meet [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
In the modern view, foundation is the heart of the way to do set theory [Hart,WD]
Foundation Axiom: an nonempty set has a member disjoint from it [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
We can choose from finite and evident sets, but not from infinite opaque ones [Hart,WD]
With the Axiom of Choice every set can be well-ordered [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
If we accept that V=L, it seems to settle all the open questions of set theory [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Naïve set theory has trouble with comprehension, the claim that every predicate has an extension [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
The iterative conception may not be necessary, and may have fixed points or infinitely descending chains [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
A 'partial ordering' is irreflexive and transitive; the sets are ordered, but not the subsets [Hart,WD]
A partial ordering becomes 'total' if any two members of its field are comparable [Hart,WD]
'Well-ordering' must have a least member, so it does the natural numbers but not the integers [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann defines α<β as α∈β [Hart,WD]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Maybe sets should be rethought in terms of the even more basic categories [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
The universal quantifier can't really mean 'all', because there is no universal set [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Modern model theory begins with the proof of Los's Conjecture in 1962 [Hart,WD]
Model theory studies how set theory can model sets of sentences [Hart,WD]
Model theory is mostly confined to first-order theories [Hart,WD]
Models are ways the world might be from a first-order point of view [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
First-order logic is 'compact': consequences of a set are consequences of a finite subset [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / c. Berry's paradox
Berry's Paradox: we succeed in referring to a number, with a term which says we can't do that [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
The Burali-Forti paradox is a crisis for Cantor's ordinals [Hart,WD]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
The machinery used to solve the Liar can be rejigged to produce a new Liar [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
The less-than relation < well-orders, and partially orders, and totally orders the ordinal numbers [Hart,WD]
The axiom of infinity with separation gives a least limit ordinal ω [Hart,WD]
There are at least as many infinite cardinals as transfinite ordinals (because they will map) [Hart,WD]
Von Neumann's ordinals generalise into the transfinite better, because Zermelo's ω is a singleton [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
19th century arithmetization of analysis isolated the real numbers from geometry [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
We can establish truths about infinite numbers by means of induction [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Euclid has a unique parallel, spherical geometry has none, and saddle geometry has several [Hart,WD]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics makes existence claims, but philosophers usually say those are never analytic [Hart,WD]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Mass words do not have plurals, or numerical adjectives, or use 'fewer' [Hart,WD]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
Fregean self-evidence is an intrinsic property of basic truths, rules and definitions [Hart,WD]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
The failure of key assumptions in geometry, mereology and set theory throw doubt on the a priori [Hart,WD]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest [Hart,WD]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 3. Taste
The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S]
Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S]
'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 4. Art as Expression
Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S]
It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 8. The Arts / a. Music
Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 1. Artistic Intentions
The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S]
We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S]
Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S]
The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 2. Copies of Art
If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S]
Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 4. Emotion in Art
Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S]
It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S]
Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S]
A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S]