24 ideas
6950 | You can be rational with undetected or minor inconsistencies [Harman] |
6954 | A coherent conceptual scheme contains best explanations of most of your beliefs [Harman] |
15091 | Restrict 'logical truth' to formal logic, rather than including analytic and metaphysical truths [Shoemaker] |
15095 | A property's causal features are essential, and only they fix its identity [Shoemaker] |
15097 | I claim that a property has its causal features in all possible worlds [Shoemaker] |
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15094 | I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
15099 | If something is possible, but not nomologically possible, we need metaphysical possibility [Shoemaker] |
15101 | Once you give up necessity as a priori, causal necessity becomes the main type of necessity [Shoemaker] |
15098 | Empirical evidence shows that imagining a phenomenon can show it is possible [Shoemaker] |
15100 | Imagination reveals conceptual possibility, where descriptions avoid contradiction or incoherence [Shoemaker] |
6955 | Enumerative induction is inference to the best explanation [Harman] |
6952 | Induction is 'defeasible', since additional information can invalidate it [Harman] |
6953 | All reasoning is inductive, and deduction only concerns implication [Harman] |
15096 | 'Grue' only has causal features because of its relation to green [Shoemaker] |
6951 | Ordinary rationality is conservative, starting from where your beliefs currently are [Harman] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
15093 | We might say laws are necessary by combining causal properties with Armstrong-Dretske-Tooley laws [Shoemaker] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |