13 ideas
| 3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
| 3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
| 3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
| 3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
| 17990 | Instances of minimal truth miss out propositions inexpressible in current English [Hofweber] |
| 3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
| 17988 | Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber] |
| 3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
| 17989 | Since properties have properties, there can be a typed or a type-free theory of them [Hofweber] |
| 3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
| 3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |
| 8130 | Qualities of experience are just representational aspects of experience ('Representationalism') [Harman, by Burge] |
| 17991 | Holism says language can't be translated; the expressibility hypothesis says everything can [Hofweber] |