18 ideas
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
1635 | Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
7627 | You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine] |
8871 | We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson] |
8826 | If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine] |
8827 | Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine] |
8899 | Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
8898 | Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
8900 | In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine] |
5121 | Basing ethics on flourishing makes it consequentialist, as actions are judged by contributing to it [Harman] |
5120 | What counts as 'flourishing' must be relative to various sets of values [Harman] |