Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning', 'The Roots of Reference' and 'Lives of Eminent Philosophers'

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18 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius]