Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are there propositions?', 'De Re and De Dicto' and 'The Structure and Content of Truth'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
13985 A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
13984 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
18902 Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13979 Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
14650 Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
14648 Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
13988 Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14647 Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14646 An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14649 Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga]
14642 Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga]
14643 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14651 What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
13983 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13978 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
13977 When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13976 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
13989 There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
13982 If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]