62 ideas
23917 | Contrary statements can both be reasonable, if they are meant in two different ways [Aristotle] |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
5869 | The thesis of the Form of the Good (or of anything else) is verbal and vacuous [Aristotle] |
22505 | The two right angles of a triangle necessitate that a quadrilateral has four [Aristotle] |
22513 | Knowing is having knowledge; understanding is using knowledge [Aristotle] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
19558 | Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S] |
19561 | We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S] |
19563 | The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S] |
19560 | Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S] |
19559 | Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S] |
23906 | Courage from spirit is natural and unconquerable, as seen in the young [Aristotle] |
20204 | Whether the mind has parts is irrelevant, since it obviously has distinct capacities [Aristotle] |
22506 | A man is the cause of what is within his power, and what he causes is in his power [Aristotle] |
22504 | Only a human being can be a starting point for an action [Aristotle] |
22510 | Some emotional states are too strong for human nature [Aristotle] |
23913 | Nearly all the good and bad states of character are concerned with feelings [Aristotle] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
23918 | Akrasia is the clash of two feelings - goodness and pleasure [Aristotle] |
22515 | Choice results when deliberation brings together an opinion with an inclination [Aristotle] |
22508 | Unlike in inanimate things, in animate things actions have more than one starting point [Aristotle] |
22514 | The deliberative part of the soul discerns explanatory causes [Aristotle] |
23319 | We are responsible if our actions reflect our motivation [Aristotle, by Frede,M] |
22507 | An action is voluntary when it is accompanied by thought of some kind [Aristotle] |
22512 | Acts are voluntary if done knowingly, by the agent, and in his power to avoid it [Aristotle] |
22509 | What is natural for us is either there at birth, or appears by normal processes [Aristotle] |
18230 | No one would choose life just for activities not done for their own sake [Aristotle] |
23909 | Wearing a shoe is its intrinsic use, and selling it (as a shoe) is its coincidental use [Aristotle] |
5870 | Everything seeks, not a single good, but its own separate good [Aristotle] |
5877 | We judge people from their deeds because we cannot see their choices (which matter more) [Aristotle] |
5868 | Horses, birds and fish are not happy, lacking a divine aspect to their natures [Aristotle] |
5865 | Happiness involves three things, of which the greatest is either wisdom, virtue, or pleasure [Aristotle] |
5876 | Virtue is different from continence [Aristotle] |
5872 | Excellence is the best state of anything (like a cloak) which has an employment or function [Aristotle] |
5875 | Character (éthos) is developed from habit (ethos) [Aristotle] |
5874 | Character virtues (such as courage) are of the non-rational part, which follows the rational part [Aristotle] |
22516 | Character is shown by what is or is not enjoyed, and virtue chooses the mean among them [Aristotle] |
22517 | We judge character not by their actions, but by their reasons for actions [Aristotle] |
23914 | People sometimes exhibit both extremes together, but the mean is contrary to both of them [Aristotle] |
23911 | Possessors of a virtue tend to despise what reason shows to be its opposite [Aristotle] |
23910 | Greatness of soul produces all the virtues - and vice versa [Aristotle] |
23908 | If someone just looks at or listens to beautiful things, they would not be thought intemperate [Aristotle] |
23905 | Courage follows reason, which tells us to choose what is noble [Aristotle] |
23912 | Honour depends on what it is for, and whether it is bestowed by worthy people [Aristotle] |
5871 | Goods in the soul are more worthy than those outside it, as everybody wants them [Aristotle] |
23920 | Decent people can be friends with base people [Aristotle] |
23919 | Friendship cannot be immediate; it takes time, and needs testing [Aristotle] |
23915 | The main function of politics is to produce friendship [Aristotle] |
23916 | The best cure for mutual injustice is friendship [Aristotle] |
5866 | It is folly not to order one's life around some end [Aristotle] |
5878 | Eyes could be used for a natural purpose, or for unnatural seeing, or for a non-seeing activity [Aristotle] |
5873 | Each thing's function is its end [Aristotle] |