32 ideas
| 7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
| 12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
| 9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
| 17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
| 17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
| 9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
| 17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
| 12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
| 12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
| 12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
| 17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
| 22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
| 12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |