38 ideas
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
19433 | The universe is infinitely varied, so the Buridan's Ass dilemma could never happen [Leibniz] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
19434 | There may be a world where dogs smell their game at a thousand leagues [Leibniz] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |