57 ideas
| 21634 | Metaphysics is (supposedly) first the ontology, then in general what things are like [Hofweber] |
| 21666 | 'Fundamentality' is either a superficial idea, or much too obscure [Hofweber] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 21640 | 'It's true that Fido is a dog' conjures up a contrast class, of 'it's false' or 'it's unlikely' [Hofweber] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 21657 | Since properties can have properties, some theorists rank them in 'types' [Hofweber] |
| 21653 | Maybe not even names are referential, but are just by used by speakers to refer [Hofweber] |
| 21636 | 'Singular terms' are not found in modern linguistics, and are not the same as noun phrases [Hofweber] |
| 21637 | If two processes are said to be identical, that doesn't make their terms refer to entities [Hofweber] |
| 21643 | The inferential quantifier focuses on truth; the domain quantifier focuses on reality [Hofweber] |
| 20457 | Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli] |
| 21644 | Numbers are used as singular terms, as adjectives, and as symbols [Hofweber] |
| 21646 | The Amazonian Piraha language is said to have no number words [Hofweber] |
| 21665 | The fundamental theorem of arithmetic is that all numbers are composed uniquely of primes [Hofweber] |
| 21649 | How can words be used for counting if they are objects? [Hofweber] |
| 21647 | Logicism makes sense of our ability to know arithmetic just by thought [Hofweber] |
| 21648 | Neo-Fregeans are dazzled by a technical result, and ignore practicalities [Hofweber] |
| 20468 | Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli] |
| 20467 | Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli] |
| 21664 | Supervenience offers little explanation for things which necessarily go together [Hofweber] |
| 21660 | Reality can be seen as the totality of facts, or as the totality of things [Hofweber] |
| 21661 | There are probably ineffable facts, systematically hidden from us [Hofweber] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 21652 | Our perceptual beliefs are about ordinary objects, not about simples arranged chair-wise [Hofweber] |
| 21663 | Counterfactuals are essential for planning, and learning from mistakes [Hofweber] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 21654 | The "Fido"-Fido theory of meaning says every expression in a language has a referent [Hofweber] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 21641 | Inferential role semantics is an alternative to semantics that connects to the world [Hofweber] |
| 21638 | Syntactic form concerns the focus of the sentence, as well as the truth-conditions [Hofweber] |
| 21658 | Properties can be expressed in a language despite the absence of a single word for them [Hofweber] |
| 21659 | 'Being taller than this' is a predicate which can express many different properties [Hofweber] |
| 21655 | Compositonality is a way to build up the truth-conditions of a sentence [Hofweber] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 21656 | Proposition have no content, because they are content [Hofweber] |
| 21635 | Without propositions there can be no beliefs or desires [Hofweber] |
| 21662 | Do there exist thoughts which we are incapable of thinking? [Hofweber] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 21645 | 'Semantic type coercion' is selecting the reading of a word to make the best sense [Hofweber] |
| 21639 | 'Background deletion' is appropriately omitting background from an answer [Hofweber] |
| 20469 | There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli] |
| 20461 | The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli] |
| 20462 | Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli] |
| 20463 | There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli] |
| 20464 | The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli] |
| 20459 | Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli] |
| 20460 | Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli] |
| 20466 | Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli] |
| 20465 | Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli] |
| 20458 | The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli] |
| 20470 | Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli] |