18 ideas
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 8956 | What is a singleton set, if a set is meant to be a collection of objects? [Szabó] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 8953 | Abstract entities don't depend on their concrete entities ...but maybe on the totality of concrete things [Szabó] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 8954 | Geometrical circles cannot identify a circular paint patch, presumably because they lack something [Szabó] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 8955 | Abstractions are imperceptible, non-causal, and non-spatiotemporal (the third explaining the others) [Szabó] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 6581 | Hume thought (unlike Locke) that property is a merely conventional relationship [Hume, by Fogelin] |