Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are there propositions?', 'Causal Relations' and 'Rearrangement of Particles'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
8349 The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
13985 A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
13984 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13979 Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15540 You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times) [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
8348 If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
13988 Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
13983 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
8347 Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13978 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
13977 When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13976 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
13989 There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
13982 If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
10371 Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
8403 Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
8346 Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
4778 A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]