15 ideas
| 18005 | Philosophy aims to become more disciplined about categories [Ryle] |
| 12695 | Epicurean atomists say body is sensible, to distinguish it from space. [Garber] |
| 14297 | A dispositional property is not a state, but a liability to be in some state, given a condition [Ryle] |
| 14300 | No physical scientist now believes in an occult force-exerting agency [Ryle] |
| 10558 | Abstract objects are actually constituted by the properties by which we conceive them [Zalta] |
| 2622 | Can one movement have a mental and physical cause? [Ryle] |
| 1354 | We cannot introspect states of anger or panic [Ryle] |
| 1353 | Reporting on myself has the same problems as reporting on you [Ryle] |
| 2624 | I cannot prepare myself for the next thought I am going to think [Ryle] |
| 2620 | Dualism is a category mistake [Ryle] |
| 2388 | Behaviour depends on desires as well as beliefs [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 3354 | You can't explain mind as dispositions, if they aren't real [Benardete,JA on Ryle] |
| 2387 | How can behaviour be the cause of behaviour? [Chalmers on Ryle] |
| 10557 | Abstract objects are captured by second-order modal logic, plus 'encoding' formulas [Zalta] |
| 12705 | Epicurean atoms are distinguished by their extreme hardness [Garber] |