Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are there propositions?', 'Conditionals' and 'Letters to Bentley'

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28 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
'¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
We can talk of 'innumerable number', about the infinite points on a line [Newton]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Not all infinites are equal [Newton]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
(A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The principles of my treatise are designed to fit with a belief in God [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
I do not pretend to know the cause of gravity [Newton]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
The motions of the planets could only derive from an intelligent agent [Newton]
That gravity should be innate and essential to matter is absurd [Newton]