257 ideas
| 20383 | The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche] |
| 4520 | I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche] |
| 13876 | The syntactic category is primary, and the ontological category is derivative [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 8415 | Never lose sight of the distinction between concept and object [Frege] |
| 9841 | Frege was the first to give linguistic answers to non-linguistic questions [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9840 | Frege initiated linguistic philosophy, studying number through the sense of sentences [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 15948 | Frege developed formal systems to avoid unnoticed assumptions [Frege, by Lavine] |
| 10804 | Thoughts have a natural order, to which human thinking is drawn [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 9832 | Frege sees no 'intersubjective' category, between objective and subjective [Dummett on Frege] |
| 8414 | Keep the psychological and subjective separate from the logical and objective [Frege] |
| 4545 | Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche] |
| 4530 | Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche] |
| 4523 | What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche] |
| 4531 | Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche] |
| 4541 | Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche] |
| 9844 | Originally Frege liked contextual definitions, but later preferred them fully explicit [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9822 | Nothing should be defined in terms of that to which it is conceptually prior [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 17495 | Proof aims to remove doubts, but also to show the interdependence of truths [Frege] |
| 8632 | You can't transfer external properties unchanged to apply to ideas [Frege] |
| 20357 | Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche] |
| 4534 | 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche] |
| 4548 | Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche] |
| 5652 | True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton] |
| 4508 | The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche] |
| 13881 | We need to grasp not number-objects, but the states of affairs which make number statements true [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 4538 | Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche] |
| 9154 | Frege agreed with Euclid that the axioms of logic and mathematics are known through self-evidence [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9157 | The null set is only defensible if it is the extension of an empty concept [Frege, by Burge] |
| 9835 | It is because a concept can be empty that there is such a thing as the empty class [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9854 | We can introduce new objects, as equivalence classes of objects already known [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9883 | Frege introduced the standard device, of defining logical objects with equivalence classes [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 18104 | Frege, unlike Russell, has infinite individuals because numbers are individuals [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9834 | A class is, for Frege, the extension of a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8645 | Convert "Jupiter has four moons" into "the number of Jupiter's moons is four" [Frege] |
| 16891 | Despite Gödel, Frege's epistemic ordering of all the truths is still plausible [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16906 | The primitive simples of arithmetic are the essence, determining the subject, and its boundaries [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 10800 | The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine] |
| 14236 | Each horse doesn't fall under the concept 'horse that draws the carriage', because all four are needed [Oliver/Smiley on Frege] |
| 22294 | We can show that a concept is consistent by producing something which falls under it [Frege] |
| 17624 | To understand axioms you must grasp their logical power and priority [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8640 | We cannot define numbers from the idea of a series, because numbers must precede that [Frege] |
| 9838 | Treating 0 as a number avoids antinomies involving treating 'nobody' as a person [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9564 | For Frege 'concept' and 'extension' are primitive, but 'zero' and 'successor' are defined [Frege, by Chihara] |
| 10551 | If objects exist because they fall under a concept, 0 is the object under which no objects fall [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8653 | Nought is the number belonging to the concept 'not identical with itself' [Frege] |
| 8636 | We can say 'a and b are F' if F is 'wise', but not if it is 'one' [Frege] |
| 8654 | One is the Number which belongs to the concept "identical with 0" [Frege] |
| 20361 | We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche] |
| 8641 | You can abstract concepts from the moon, but the number one is not among them [Frege] |
| 9989 | Units can be equal without being identical [Tait on Frege] |
| 17429 | Frege says only concepts which isolate and avoid arbitrary division can give units [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17427 | Frege's 'isolation' could be absence of overlap, or drawing conceptual boundaries [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17437 | Non-arbitrary division means that what falls under the concept cannot be divided into more of the same [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17438 | Our concepts decide what is countable, as in seeing the leaves of the tree, or the foliage [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 17426 | A concept creating a unit must isolate and unify what falls under it [Frege] |
| 17428 | Frege says counting is determining what number belongs to a given concept [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 15916 | Frege's one-to-one correspondence replaces well-ordering, because infinities can't be counted [Frege, by Lavine] |
| 10034 | The number of natural numbers is not a natural number [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 16883 | Arithmetical statements can't be axioms, because they are provable [Frege, by Burge] |
| 17460 | A statement of number contains a predication about a concept [Frege] |
| 16890 | Frege's problem is explaining the particularity of numbers by general laws [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8630 | Individual numbers are best derived from the number one, and increase by one [Frege] |
| 11029 | 'Exactly ten gallons' may not mean ten things instantiate 'gallon' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 10013 | Numerical statements have first-order logical form, so must refer to objects [Frege, by Hodes] |
| 18181 | The Number for F is the extension of 'equal to F' (or maybe just F itself) [Frege] |
| 18103 | Numbers are objects because they partake in identity statements [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 10625 | Frege had a motive to treat numbers as objects, but not a justification [Hale/Wright on Frege] |
| 13871 | Frege claims that numbers are objects, as opposed to them being Fregean concepts [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 13872 | Numbers are second-level, ascribing properties to concepts rather than to objects [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9816 | For Frege, successor was a relation, not a function [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9953 | Numbers are more than just 'second-level concepts', since existence is also one [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9954 | "Number of x's such that ..x.." is a functional expression, yielding a name when completed [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10139 | Frege gives an incoherent account of extensions resulting from abstraction [Fine,K on Frege] |
| 10028 | For Frege the number of F's is a collection of first-level concepts [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 17636 | A cardinal number may be defined as a class of similar classes [Frege, by Russell] |
| 10029 | Numbers need to be objects, to define the extension of the concept of each successor to n [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9973 | The number of F's is the extension of the second level concept 'is equipollent with F' [Frege, by Tait] |
| 16500 | Frege showed that numbers attach to concepts, not to objects [Frege, by Wiggins] |
| 9990 | Frege replaced Cantor's sets as the objects of equinumerosity attributions with concepts [Frege, by Tait] |
| 7738 | Zero is defined using 'is not self-identical', and one by using the concept of zero [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 23456 | Frege said logical predication implies classes, which are arithmetical objects [Frege, by Morris,M] |
| 13887 | Frege started with contextual definition, but then switched to explicit extensional definition [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 13897 | Each number, except 0, is the number of the concept of all of its predecessors [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 9856 | Frege's account of cardinals fails in modern set theory, so they are now defined differently [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9902 | Frege's incorrect view is that a number is an equivalence class [Benacerraf on Frege] |
| 17814 | The natural number n is the set of n-membered sets [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 17819 | A set doesn't have a fixed number, because the elements can be seen in different ways [Yourgrau on Frege] |
| 17820 | If you can subdivide objects many ways for counting, you can do that to set-elements too [Yourgrau on Frege] |
| 9956 | 'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 13527 | Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS] |
| 22292 | Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter] |
| 17442 | Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck] |
| 11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
| 10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
| 16896 | If numbers can be derived from logic, then set theory is superfluous [Frege, by Burge] |
| 8639 | If numbers are supposed to be patterns, each number can have many patterns [Frege] |
| 13874 | Numbers seem to be objects because they exactly fit the inference patterns for identities [Frege] |
| 13875 | Frege's platonism proposes that objects are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7731 | How can numbers be external (one pair of boots is two boots), or subjective (and so relative)? [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 7737 | Identities refer to objects, so numbers must be objects [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 8635 | Numbers are not physical, and not ideas - they are objective and non-sensible [Frege] |
| 8652 | Numbers are objects, because they can take the definite article, and can't be plurals [Frege] |
| 17816 | Frege's logicism aimed at removing the reliance of arithmetic on intuition [Frege, by Yourgrau] |
| 8633 | There is no physical difference between two boots and one pair of boots [Frege] |
| 9951 | It appears that numbers are adjectives, but they don't apply to a single object [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 9952 | Numerical adjectives are of the same second-level type as the existential quantifier [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 11031 | 'Jupiter has many moons' won't read as 'The number of Jupiter's moons equals the number many' [Rumfitt on Frege] |
| 8637 | The number 'one' can't be a property, if any object can be viewed as one or not one [Frege] |
| 9999 | For science, we can translate adjectival numbers into noun form [Frege] |
| 7739 | Arithmetic is analytic [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 9945 | Logicism shows that no empirical truths are needed to justify arithmetic [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 8782 | Frege offered a Platonist version of logicism, committed to cardinal and real numbers [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 13608 | Mathematics has no special axioms of its own, but follows from principles of logic (with definitions) [Frege, by Bostock] |
| 16905 | Arithmetic must be based on logic, because of its total generality [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 5658 | Numbers are definable in terms of mapping items which fall under concepts [Frege, by Scruton] |
| 8655 | Arithmetic is analytic and a priori, and thus it is part of logic [Frege] |
| 10831 | Frege only managed to prove that arithmetic was analytic with a logic that included set-theory [Quine on Frege] |
| 13864 | Frege's platonism and logicism are in conflict, if logic must dictates an infinity of objects [Wright,C on Frege] |
| 10033 | Why should the existence of pure logic entail the existence of objects? [George/Velleman on Frege] |
| 10010 | Frege's belief in logicism and in numerical objects seem uncomfortable together [Hodes on Frege] |
| 9631 | Formalism fails to recognise types of symbols, and also meta-games [Frege, by Brown,JR] |
| 4533 | Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche] |
| 9875 | Frege was completing Bolzano's work, of expelling intuition from number theory and analysis [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8642 | Abstraction from things produces concepts, and numbers are in the concepts [Frege] |
| 8621 | Mental states are irrelevant to mathematics, because they are vague and fluctuating [Frege] |
| 8643 | Affirmation of existence is just denial of zero [Frege] |
| 20359 | The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche] |
| 8911 | If abstracta are non-mental, quarks are abstracta, and yet chess and God's thoughts are mental [Rosen on Frege] |
| 8634 | The equator is imaginary, but not fictitious; thought is needed to recognise it [Frege] |
| 17443 | Many of us find Frege's claim that truths depend on one another an obscure idea [Heck on Frege] |
| 17445 | Parallelism is intuitive, so it is more fundamental than sameness of direction [Frege, by Heck] |
| 10539 | Frege refers to 'concrete' objects, but they are no different in principle from abstract ones [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4525 | There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche] |
| 4543 | There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche] |
| 17431 | Vagueness is incomplete definition [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 13879 | For Frege, ontological questions are to be settled by reference to syntactic structures [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 10642 | Second-order quantifiers are committed to concepts, as first-order commits to objects [Frege, by Linnebo] |
| 4484 | Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche] |
| 10032 | 'Ancestral' relations are derived by iterating back from a given relation [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 10606 | Frege treats properties as a kind of function, and maybe a property is its characteristic function [Frege, by Smith,P] |
| 4546 | We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche] |
| 4544 | A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche] |
| 8647 | Not all objects are spatial; 4 can still be an object, despite lacking spatial co-ordinates [Frege] |
| 10309 | Frege says singular terms denote objects, numerals are singular terms, so numbers exist [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10550 | Frege establishes abstract objects independently from concrete ones, by falling under a concept [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8785 | For Frege, objects just are what singular terms refer to [Frege, by Hale/Wright] |
| 10278 | Without concepts we would not have any objects [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 17432 | Frege's universe comes already divided into objects [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 20362 | We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche] |
| 16022 | The idea of a criterion of identity was introduced by Frege [Frege, by Noonan] |
| 11100 | Frege's algorithm of identity is the law of putting equals for equals [Frege, by Quine] |
| 12153 | Geach denies Frege's view, that 'being the same F' splits into being the same and being F [Perry on Frege] |
| 9853 | Identity between objects is not a consequence of identity, but part of what 'identity' means [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4528 | For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche] |
| 4537 | We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche] |
| 17623 | To understand a thought you must understand its logical structure [Frege, by Burge] |
| 4485 | Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche] |
| 4487 | A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche] |
| 9158 | For Frege a priori knowledge derives from general principles, so numbers can't be primitive [Frege] |
| 8657 | Mathematicians just accept self-evidence, whether it is logical or intuitive [Frege] |
| 9352 | An a priori truth is one derived from general laws which do not require proof [Frege] |
| 16889 | A truth is a priori if it can be proved entirely from general unproven laws [Frege] |
| 4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
| 2514 | Frege tried to explain synthetic a priori truths by expanding the concept of analyticity [Frege, by Katz] |
| 4529 | All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche] |
| 4532 | We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche] |
| 16900 | Intuitions cannot be communicated [Frege, by Burge] |
| 16903 | Justifications show the ordering of truths, and the foundation is what is self-evident [Frege, by Jeshion] |
| 4486 | The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche] |
| 8624 | Induction is merely psychological, with a principle that it can actually establish laws [Frege] |
| 8626 | In science one observation can create high probability, while a thousand might prove nothing [Frege] |
| 8648 | Ideas are not spatial, and don't have distances between them [Frege] |
| 4536 | It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche] |
| 4551 | Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche] |
| 4527 | Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche] |
| 20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
| 8620 | Thought is the same everywhere, and the laws of thought do not vary [Frege] |
| 23938 | Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche] |
| 23939 | We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche] |
| 9870 | Early Frege takes the extensions of concepts for granted [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13878 | Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates [Frege, by Wright,C] |
| 7736 | A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object [Frege, by Weiner] |
| 17430 | Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability [Frege, by Koslicki] |
| 8622 | Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth [Frege] |
| 8651 | A concept is a possible predicate of a singular judgement [Frege] |
| 9846 | Defining 'direction' by parallelism doesn't tell you whether direction is a line [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9976 | Frege accepts abstraction to the concept of all sets equipollent to a given one [Tait on Frege] |
| 10803 | Frege himself abstracts away from tone and color [Yablo on Frege] |
| 9988 | If we abstract 'from' two cats, the units are not black or white, or cats [Tait on Frege] |
| 9855 | Frege's logical abstaction identifies a common feature as the maximal set of equivalent objects [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 10802 | Frege's 'parallel' and 'direction' don't have the same content, as we grasp 'parallel' first [Yablo on Frege] |
| 10525 | Frege put the idea of abstraction on a rigorous footing [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 10526 | Fregean abstraction creates concepts which are equivalences between initial items [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 10556 | We create new abstract concepts by carving up the content in a different way [Frege] |
| 9882 | You can't simultaneously fix the truth-conditions of a sentence and the domain of its variables [Dummett on Frege] |
| 9881 | From basing 'parallel' on identity of direction, Frege got all abstractions from identity statements [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8646 | Words in isolation seem to have ideas as meanings, but words have meaning in propositions [Frege] |
| 7732 | Never ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition [Frege] |
| 9370 | A statement is analytic if substitution of synonyms can make it a logical truth [Frege, by Boghossian] |
| 8743 | Frege considered analyticity to be an epistemic concept [Frege, by Shapiro] |
| 20295 | All analytic truths can become logical truths, by substituting definitions or synonyms [Frege, by Rey] |
| 2515 | Frege fails to give a concept of analyticity, so he fails to explain synthetic a priori truth that way [Katz on Frege] |
| 4554 | The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche] |
| 4552 | There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche] |
| 4521 | None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche] |
| 4496 | 'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche] |
| 20136 | There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche] |
| 20358 | The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche] |
| 20369 | The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche] |
| 4506 | There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche] |
| 4514 | The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche] |
| 20370 | All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche] |
| 20354 | The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche] |
| 4505 | How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche] |
| 4509 | Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche] |
| 4500 | It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche] |
| 4558 | We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche] |
| 4550 | Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche] |
| 4518 | The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
| 4519 | The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche] |
| 4517 | Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche] |
| 4560 | The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche] |
| 4555 | The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche] |
| 4494 | Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche] |
| 4498 | 'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche] |
| 4493 | Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche] |
| 4511 | We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche] |
| 4512 | Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche] |
| 20372 | The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche] |
| 4510 | A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche] |
| 4515 | Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche] |
| 4516 | Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche] |
| 4559 | When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche] |
| 4557 | The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche] |
| 4507 | The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche] |
| 4501 | Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche] |
| 4489 | If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche] |
| 4513 | Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche] |
| 4504 | Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche] |
| 4495 | The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche] |
| 4491 | In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche] |
| 8619 | To learn something, you must know that you don't know [Frege] |
| 4542 | Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche] |
| 4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
| 8656 | The laws of number are not laws of nature, but are laws of the laws of nature [Frege] |
| 4535 | A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche] |
| 4497 | The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche] |
| 4488 | Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche] |
| 4502 | Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche] |
| 22286 | Existence is not a first-level concept (of God), but a second-level property of concepts [Frege, by Potter] |
| 8644 | Because existence is a property of concepts the ontological argument for God fails [Frege] |
| 4499 | Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche] |