26 ideas
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
| 13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
| 5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |