Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are there propositions?', 'The Thesis that Mathematics is Logic' and 'Guidebook to Wittgenstein's Tractatus'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
23449 Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
13985 A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
13984 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13979 Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
10066 Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
23484 Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
23494 Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
23451 Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M]
23460 To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M]
23452 Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
13988 Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
13983 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13978 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
13977 When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13976 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
23491 There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
13989 There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
13982 If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]