35 ideas
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
12132 | Indiscernibility is a necessary and sufficient condition for identity [Brody] |
15834 | Brody bases sortal essentialism on properties required throughout something's existence [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12140 | Modern emphasis is on properties had essentially; traditional emphasis is on sort-defining properties [Brody] |
11895 | A sortal essence is a property which once possessed always possessed [Brody, by Mackie,P] |
12141 | Maybe essential properties are those which determine a natural kind? [Brody] |
12137 | De re essentialism standardly says all possible objects identical with a have a's essential properties [Brody] |
12142 | Essentially, a has P, always had P, must have had P, and has never had a future without P [Brody] |
12143 | An object having a property essentially is equivalent to its having it necessarily [Brody] |
12144 | Essentialism is justified if the essential properties of things explain their other properties [Brody] |
12139 | Mereological essentialism says that every part that ensures the existence is essential [Brody] |
12135 | Interrupted objects have two first moments of existence, which could be two beginnings [Brody] |
12130 | a and b share all properties; so they share being-identical-with-a; so a = b [Brody] |
12138 | Identity across possible worlds is prior to rigid designation [Brody] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
7404 | Nations are not obliged to help one-another, but are obliged not to harm one another [Grotius, by Tuck] |
7402 | Everyone has a right of self-preservation, and harming others is usually unjustifiable [Grotius, by Tuck] |
21938 | Democracy needs respect for individuality, but the 'community of friends' implies strict equality [Grotius] |
19845 | A person is free to renounce their state, as long as it is not a moment of crisis [Grotius, by Rousseau] |
22133 | Grotius and Pufendorf based natural law on real (rather than idealised) humanity [Grotius, by Ford,JD] |
7406 | A natural right of self-preservation is balanced by a natural law to avoid unnecessary harm [Grotius, by Tuck] |
7403 | Grotius ignored elaborate natural law theories, preferring a basic right of self-preservation [Grotius, by Tuck] |
23585 | It is permissible in a just cause to capture a place in neutral territory [Grotius] |
6892 | Moral principles have some validity without a God commanding obedience [Grotius, by Mautner] |