Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are there propositions?', 'In Metaphysics' and 'A Materialist Theory of Mind (Rev)'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
13985 A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
13984 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13979 Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
16660 Are things distinct if they are both separate, or if only one of them can be separate? [Duns Scotus, by Pasnau]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
13988 Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
14330 To be realists about dispositions, we can only discuss them through their categorical basis [Armstrong]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
16626 Substance is only grasped under the general heading of 'being' [Duns Scotus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
6498 Armstrong suggests secondary qualities are blurred primary qualities [Armstrong, by Robinson,H]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
13983 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
5690 A mental state without belief refutes self-intimation; a belief with no state refutes infallibility [Armstrong, by Shoemaker]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
5493 If pains are defined causally, and research shows that the causal role is physical, then pains are physical [Armstrong, by Lycan]
4600 Armstrong and Lewis see functionalism as an identity of the function and its realiser [Armstrong, by Heil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13978 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
13977 When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13976 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
13989 There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
13982 If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]