28 ideas
| 19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
| 19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
| 13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
| 13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
| 19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
| 13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
| 11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
| 19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
| 19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
| 19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
| 19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
| 19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
| 13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
| 13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
| 19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
| 13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
| 13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
| 13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
| 19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |
| 13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
| 13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
| 13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
| 13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
| 13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
| 20033 | Intentions are normative, requiring commitment and further plans [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20034 | Intentions must be mutually consistent, affirm appropriate means, and fit the agent's beliefs [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20026 | Intention is either the aim of an action, or a long-term constraint on what we can do [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20032 | Bratman rejected reducing intentions to belief-desire, because they motivate, and have their own standards [Bratman, by Wilson/Schpall] |