29 ideas
2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
22450 | If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot] |
2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |