Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Are there propositions?', 'Quaestiones de Potentia Dei' and 'Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 2. Correspondence to Facts
13985 A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
13984 Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
19081 Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
13979 Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / c. Facts and truths
13988 Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
17555 'One' can mean undivided and not a multitude, or it can add measurement, giving number [Aquinas]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
8806 The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
13983 Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
8252 Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
8255 Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
8804 Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8801 Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
8805 Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
13980 If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13978 Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
13977 When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13976 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13981 Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle]
13987 We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
13989 There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle]
13982 If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
18703 Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]