39 ideas
13985 | A true proposition seems true of one fact, but a false proposition seems true of nothing at all. [Ryle] |
13984 | Two maps might correspond to one another, but they are only 'true' of the country they show [Ryle] |
13979 | Logic studies consequence, compatibility, contradiction, corroboration, necessitation, grounding.... [Ryle] |
12215 | The existence of numbers is not a matter of identities, but of constituents of the world [Fine,K] |
12211 | It is plausible that x^2 = -1 had no solutions before complex numbers were 'introduced' [Fine,K] |
12209 | The indispensability argument shows that nature is non-numerical, not the denial of numbers [Fine,K] |
17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
12214 | 'Exists' is a predicate, not a quantifier; 'electrons exist' is like 'electrons spin' [Fine,K] |
12212 | Just as we introduced complex numbers, so we introduced sums and temporal parts [Fine,K] |
12216 | Real objects are those which figure in the facts that constitute reality [Fine,K] |
12218 | Being real and being fundamental are separate; Thales's water might be real and divisible [Fine,K] |
12217 | For ontology we need, not internal or external views, but a view from outside reality [Fine,K] |
17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
13988 | Many sentences do not state facts, but there are no facts which could not be stated [Ryle] |
12213 | Ontological claims are often universal, and not a matter of existential quantification [Fine,K] |
17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
13983 | Representation assumes you know the ideas, and the reality, and the relation between the two [Ryle] |
17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
13980 | If you like judgments and reject propositions, what are the relata of incoherence in a judgment? [Ryle] |
13978 | Husserl and Meinong wanted objective Meanings and Propositions, as subject-matter for Logic [Ryle] |
13977 | When I utter a sentence, listeners grasp both my meaning and my state of mind [Ryle] |
13976 | 'Propositions' name what is thought, because 'thoughts' and 'judgments' are too ambiguous [Ryle] |
13981 | Several people can believe one thing, or make the same mistake, or share one delusion [Ryle] |
13987 | We may think in French, but we don't know or believe in French [Ryle] |
13989 | There are no propositions; they are just sentences, used for thinking, which link to facts in a certain way [Ryle] |
13982 | If we accept true propositions, it is hard to reject false ones, and even nonsensical ones [Ryle] |
17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |