13 ideas
3509 | Externalism may be the key idea in philosophical naturalism [Papineau] |
17368 | Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt] |
17370 | Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt] |
16721 | Changes in secondary qualities are caused by changes in primary qualities [Giles of Orleans] |
3513 | How does a dualist mind represent, exist outside space, and be transparent to itself? [Papineau] |
3514 | Functionalism needs causation and intentionality to explain actions [Papineau] |
3511 | Supervenience requires all mental events to have physical effects [Papineau] |
3510 | Epiphenomenalism is supervenience without physicalism [Papineau] |
3515 | Knowing what it is like to be something only involves being (physically) that thing [Papineau] |
3512 | If a mental state is multiply realisable, why does it lead to similar behaviour? [Papineau] |
3516 | The Private Language argument only means people may misjudge their experiences [Papineau] |
17369 | We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt] |
17367 | Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG] |