Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Actual and the Virtual', 'Letters to Foucher' and 'Philosophical Logic: Intro to Advanced Topics'

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11 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
13913 The four 'perfect syllogisms' are called Barbara, Celarent, Darii and Ferio [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
13914 Syllogistic logic has one rule: what is affirmed/denied of wholes is affirmed/denied of their parts [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
13915 Syllogistic can't handle sentences with singular terms, or relational terms, or compound sentences [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
13916 Term logic uses expression letters and brackets, and '-' for negative terms, and '+' for compound terms [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
13850 In modern logic all formal validity can be characterised syntactically [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
13849 Classical logic rests on truth and models, where constructivist logic rests on defence and refutation [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
13851 Unlike most other signs, = cannot be eliminated [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
13852 Axioms are ω-incomplete if the instances are all derivable, but the universal quantification isn't [Engelbretsen/Sayward]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 5. Category Anti-Realism
21907 We don't want another new set of categories; we want a variety of flexible categories [Deleuze, by May]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
13095 Essence is primitive force, or a law of change [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
2117 The connection in events enables us to successfully predict the future, so there must be a constant cause [Leibniz]