Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Difference and Repetition', 'Truth-makers' and 'Regressive Method for Premises in Mathematics'

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23 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 1. Continental Philosophy
'Difference' refers to that which eludes capture [Deleuze, by May]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
Part-whole is the key relation among truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
Moments (objects which cannot exist alone) may serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
The truth-maker for a sentence may not be unique, or may be a combination, or several separate items [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Truth-makers cannot be the designata of the sentences they make true [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
Despite negative propositions, truthmakers are not logical complexes, but ordinary experiences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence has to invoke facts or states of affairs, just to serve as truth-makers [Mulligan/Simons/Smith]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 1. Axiomatisation
Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell]
Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell]
The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Ontology can be continual creation, not to know being, but to probe the unknowable [Deleuze]
'Being' is univocal, but its subject matter is actually 'difference' [Deleuze]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
Ontology does not tell what there is; it is just a strange adventure [Deleuze, by May]
Being is a problem to be engaged, not solved, and needs a new mode of thinking [Deleuze, by May]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell]