Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'On Sense and Reference' and 'Letter to Herodotus'

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59 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard]
A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury]
People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer]
It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege]
In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 6. Intensionalism
Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette]
Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus]
If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus]
Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter]
The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K]
Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege]
Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege]
Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA]
The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege]
In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege]
We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence]
Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett]
Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett]
Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege]
Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus]
Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus]
Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus]
There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Bruno said that ancient Egyptian magic was the true religion [Bruno, by Yates]