15 ideas
18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
9287 | Bruno said that ancient Egyptian magic was the true religion [Bruno, by Yates] |