Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Interview with Philippa Foot' and 'The Reasons of Love'

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26 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 9. Normative Necessity
Love creates a necessity concerning what to care about [Frankfurt]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / b. Human rationality
Full rationality must include morality [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Practical reason is goodness in choosing actions [Foot]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
It is an odd Humean view to think a reason to act must always involve caring [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Ranking order of desires reveals nothing, because none of them may be considered important [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Morality isn't based on reason; moral indignation is quite unlike disapproval of irrationality [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Human defects are just like plant or animal defects [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / k. Ethics from nature
Concepts such as function, welfare, flourishing and interests only apply to living things [Foot]
Humans need courage like a plant needs roots [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
There is no fact-value gap in 'owls should see in the dark' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
It is by caring about things that we infuse the world with importance [Frankfurt]
If you don't care about at least one thing, you can't find reasons to care about anything [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
What is worthwhile for its own sake alone may be worth very little [Frankfurt]
Our criteria for evaluating how to live offer an answer to the problem [Frankfurt]
Principles are not ultimate, but arise from the necessities of human life [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
If you demonstrate the reason to act, there is no further question of 'why should I?' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Rather than loving things because we value them, I think we value things because we love them [Frankfurt]
Love can be cool, and it may not involve liking its object [Frankfurt]
The paradigm case of pure love is not romantic, but that between parents and infants [Frankfurt]
I value my children for their sake, but I also value my love for them for its own sake [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We might not choose a very moral life, if the character or constitution was deficient [Frankfurt]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / a. Nature of pleasure
People want to fulfill their desires, but also for their desires to be sustained [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Loving oneself is not a failing, but is essential to a successful life [Frankfurt]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Boredom is serious, not just uncomfortable; it threatens our psychic survival [Frankfurt]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Freedom needs autonomy (rather than causal independence) - embracing our own desires and choices [Frankfurt]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 2. Greek Polytheism
Bruno said that ancient Egyptian magic was the true religion [Bruno, by Yates]