14 ideas
14212 | A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those [Lewis] |
14213 | Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth [Lewis] |
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
17619 | We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
14210 | A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints [Lewis] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
14215 | Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy [Lewis] |
14209 | Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications) [Lewis] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |