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All the ideas for 'Eight Theories of Ethics', 'Truth (2nd edn)' and 'Properties'

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45 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
The function of the truth predicate? Understanding 'true'? Meaning of 'true'? The concept of truth? A theory of truth? [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Some correspondence theories concern facts; others are built up through reference and satisfaction [Horwich]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The common-sense theory of correspondence has never been worked out satisfactorily [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical form is the aspects of meaning that determine logical entailments [Horwich]
Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 3. Subjectivism
'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
We could know the truth-conditions of a foreign sentence without knowing its meaning [Horwich]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
There are Fregean de dicto propositions, and Russellian de re propositions, or a mixture [Horwich]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Right translation is a mapping of languages which preserves basic patterns of usage [Horwich]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 1. Existentialism
It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 5. Existence-Essence
Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham]