15 ideas
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
12394 | If the result is bad, we change the rule; if we like the rule, we reject the result [Goodman] |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
14292 | Dispositions seem more ethereal than behaviour; a non-occult account of them would be nice [Goodman] |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
18749 | Goodman argued that the confirmation relation can never be formalised [Goodman, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17646 | Goodman showed that every sound inductive argument has an unsound one of the same form [Goodman, by Putnam] |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
4794 | We don't use laws to make predictions, we call things laws if we make predictions with them [Goodman] |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |