Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Being (frags)', 'The Justification of Deduction' and 'The Nature of Mental States'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 6. Conclusive Proof
A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett]
In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett]
Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions need mental terms to define them [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Total paralysis would mean that there were mental states but no behaviour at all [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Is pain a functional state of a complete organism? [Putnam]
Functionalism is compatible with dualism, as pure mind could perform the functions [Putnam]
Functional states correlate with AND explain pain behaviour [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Temperature is mean molecular kinetic energy, but they are two different concepts [Putnam]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Neuroscience does not support multiple realisability, and tends to support identity [Polger on Putnam]
If humans and molluscs both feel pain, it can't be a single biological state [Putnam, by Kim]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett]