Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Being (frags)', 'Epistemology Naturalized' and 'Reference and Necessity'

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19 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
To understand a name (unlike a description) picking the thing out is sufficient? [Stalnaker]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics reduces to set theory (which is a bit vague and unobvious), but not to logic proper [Quine]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
Possible worlds allow separating all the properties, without hitting a bare particular [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
If it might be true, it might be true in particular ways, and possible worlds describe such ways [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds are ontologically neutral, but a commitment to possibilities remains [Stalnaker]
Possible worlds allow discussion of modality without controversial modal auxiliaries [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
Kripke's possible worlds are methodological, not metaphysical [Stalnaker]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Rigid designation seems to presuppose that differing worlds contain the same individuals [Stalnaker]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
You can't reduce epistemology to psychology, because that presupposes epistemology [Maund on Quine]
We should abandon a search for justification or foundations, and focus on how knowledge is acquired [Quine, by Davidson]
If we abandon justification and normativity in epistemology, we must also abandon knowledge [Kim on Quine]
Without normativity, naturalized epistemology isn't even about beliefs [Kim on Quine]
Epistemology is a part of psychology, studying how our theories relate to our evidence [Quine]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
If you don't know what you say you can't mean it; what people say usually fits what they mean [Stalnaker]
Inculcations of meanings of words rests ultimately on sensory evidence [Quine]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
In the use of a name, many individuals are causally involved, but they aren't all the referent [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
'Descriptive' semantics gives a system for a language; 'foundational' semantics give underlying facts [Stalnaker]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
To understand an utterance, you must understand what the world would be like if it is true [Stalnaker]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
In observation sentences, we could substitute community acceptance for analyticity [Quine]