Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Samuel Clarke', 'The Extended Mind' and 'There is no question of physicalism'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


24 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Some suggest that materialism is empty, because 'physical' cannot be properly characterized [Mellor/Crane, by Papineau]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
A notebook counts as memory, if is available to consciousness and guides our actions [Clark/Chalmers]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
Causation depends on intrinsic properties [Mellor/Crane]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 6. Anti-Individualism
A mechanism can count as 'cognitive' whether it is in the brain or outside it [Clark/Chalmers, by Rowlands]
If something in the world could equally have been a mental process, it is part of our cognition [Clark/Chalmers]
Consciousness may not extend beyond the head, but cognition need not be conscious [Clark/Chalmers]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
If a person relies on their notes, those notes are parted of the extended system which is the person [Clark/Chalmers]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
There are many psychophysicals laws - about the effects of sweets, colours and soft cushions [Mellor/Crane]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
No defences of physicalism can deprive psychology of the ontological authority of other sciences [Mellor/Crane]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz]
Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz]
Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz]