Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Conspectus libelli (book outline)', 'Russell' and 'Propositions'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19215 Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19205 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
19209 Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
19208 The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
19207 Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
6408 Russell needed three extra axioms to reduce maths to logic: infinity, choice and reducibility [Grayling]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
12699 A body would be endless disunited parts, if it did not have a unifying form or soul [Leibniz]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / d. Form as unifier
12700 Form or soul gives unity and duration; matter gives multiplicity and change [Leibniz]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
19214 In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
12736 If we understand God and his choices, we have a priori knowledge of contingent truths [Leibniz, by Garber]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
6414 Two propositions might seem self-evident, but contradict one another [Grayling]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 3. Panpsychism
12698 Every body contains a kind of sense and appetite, or a soul [Leibniz]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
19217 I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
19203 A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
19200 Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks]
19206 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
19202 Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks]
19204 True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks]
19210 The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
19201 Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks]
19211 Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
19212 Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks]
19213 We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks]