14 ideas
| 19306 | It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman] |
| 19304 | The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman] |
| 19307 | If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman] |
| 19309 | Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman] |
| 19303 | Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman] |
| 19405 | Substances are in harmony, because they each express the one reality in themselves [Leibniz] |
| 19305 | The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman] |
| 19310 | High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman] |
| 19308 | We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman] |
| 6455 | Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey] |
| 6454 | Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey] |
| 6453 | Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey] |
| 19311 | In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman] |
| 19312 | Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman] |