38 ideas
| 12249 | 'Animal' is a genus and 'rational' is a specific difference [Oderberg] |
| 12242 | Definition distinguishes one kind from another, and individuation picks out members of the kind [Oderberg] |
| 18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
| 18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
| 18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
| 18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
| 18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
| 18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
| 18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
| 18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
| 18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
| 18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
| 12238 | The Aristotelian view is that numbers depend on (and are abstracted from) other things [Oderberg] |
| 12254 | Being is substantial/accidental, complete/incomplete, necessary/contingent, possible, relative, intrinsic.. [Oderberg] |
| 18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
| 12253 | If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg] |
| 12256 | We need to distinguish the essential from the non-essential powers [Oderberg] |
| 12252 | Empiricists gave up 'substance', as unknowable substratum, or reducible to a bundle [Oderberg] |
| 12241 | Essences are real, about being, knowable, definable and classifiable [Oderberg, by PG] |
| 12244 | Nominalism is consistent with individual but not with universal essences [Oderberg] |
| 12240 | Essentialism is the main account of the unity of objects [Oderberg] |
| 12247 | Essence is not explanatory but constitutive [Oderberg] |
| 12258 | Properties are not part of an essence, but they flow from it [Oderberg] |
| 12257 | Could we replace essence with collections of powers? [Oderberg] |
| 12236 | Leibniz's Law is an essentialist truth [Oderberg] |
| 12250 | Bodies have act and potency, the latter explaining new kinds of existence [Oderberg] |
| 12234 | Realism about possible worlds is circular, since it needs a criterion of 'possible' [Oderberg] |
| 12235 | Necessity of identity seems trivial, because it leaves out the real essence [Oderberg] |
| 12237 | Rigid designation has at least three essentialist presuppositions [Oderberg] |
| 12245 | Essence is the source of a thing's characteristic behaviour [Oderberg] |
| 19399 | Prime matter is nothing when it is at rest [Leibniz] |
| 12246 | What makes Parmenidean reality a One rather than a Many? [Oderberg] |
| 12239 | The real essentialist is not merely a scientist [Oderberg] |
| 12243 | The reductionism found in scientific essentialism is mistaken [Oderberg] |