15 ideas
22664 | I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick] |
22665 | Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick] |
10061 | The If-thenist view only seems to work for the axiomatised portions of mathematics [Musgrave] |
10065 | Perhaps If-thenism survives in mathematics if we stick to first-order logic [Musgrave] |
10049 | Logical truths may contain non-logical notions, as in 'all men are men' [Musgrave] |
10050 | A statement is logically true if it comes out true in all interpretations in all (non-empty) domains [Musgrave] |
10058 | No two numbers having the same successor relies on the Axiom of Infinity [Musgrave] |
10062 | Formalism seems to exclude all creative, growing mathematics [Musgrave] |
10063 | Formalism is a bulwark of logical positivism [Musgrave] |
19393 | What is not active is nothing [Leibniz] |
22663 | Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick] |
22662 | In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick] |
22666 | Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick] |
22667 | Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick] |
10060 | Logical positivists adopted an If-thenist version of logicism about numbers [Musgrave] |