Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Exigency to Exist in Essences', 'Contingent Identity' and 'Reflections on my Critics'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


20 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz]
God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]