19 ideas
9208 | Philosophers with a new concept are like children with a new toy [Fine,K] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
19400 | Possibles demand existence, so as many of them as possible must actually exist [Leibniz] |
19401 | God's sufficient reason for choosing reality is in the fitness or perfection of possibilities [Leibniz] |
9210 | Possible objects are abstract; actual concrete objects are possible; so abstract/concrete are compatible [Fine,K] |
9211 | A non-standard realism, with no privileged standpoint, might challenge its absoluteness or coherence [Fine,K] |
9202 | Objects, as well as sentences, can have logical form [Fine,K] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
9206 | We must distinguish between the identity or essence of an object, and its necessary features [Fine,K] |
9205 | The three basic types of necessity are metaphysical, natural and normative [Fine,K] |
9209 | Metaphysical necessity may be 'whatever the circumstance', or 'regardless of circumstances' [Fine,K] |
9200 | Empiricists suspect modal notions: either it happens or it doesn't; it is just regularities. [Fine,K] |
19402 | The actual universe is the richest composite of what is possible [Leibniz] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
9207 | If sentence content is all worlds where it is true, all necessary truths have the same content! [Fine,K] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |