17 ideas
17892 | For clear questions posed by reason, reason can also find clear answers [Gödel] |
9188 | Gödel proved that first-order logic is complete, and second-order logic incomplete [Gödel, by Dummett] |
10620 | Originally truth was viewed with total suspicion, and only demonstrability was accepted [Gödel] |
17883 | Gödel's Theorems did not refute the claim that all good mathematical questions have answers [Gödel, by Koellner] |
17885 | Gödel eventually hoped for a generalised completeness theorem leaving nothing undecidable [Gödel, by Koellner] |
10614 | The real reason for Incompleteness in arithmetic is inability to define truth in a language [Gödel] |
5044 | Reality must be made of basic unities, which will be animated, substantial points [Leibniz] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
5045 | No machine or mere organised matter could have a unified self [Leibniz] |
5046 | The soul does know bodies, although they do not influence one another [Leibniz] |
5043 | To regard animals as mere machines may be possible, but seems improbable [Leibniz] |